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Our choices often arise from a consideration of options presented in a sequence
(e.g. the products in a supermarket row). However, whether the precise
sequential order of option presentation affects decision-making remains
poorly understood. A recent model of choice proposes that, in a set of options
presented sequentially, those that are better than expected will be perceived as
more valuable, even when options are objectively equivalent within the set.
Inspired by this proposal, we devised a novel decision-making task where
we manipulated the order of option presentation together with expectations
about option value. Even when we compared trials that were exactly equival-
ent except for option order, we observed a striking preference for options that
were better than expected. Our findings show that expectations about options
affect which option will be favoured within a sequence, an influence which is
manifested as a preference for better-than-expected options. The findings have
potential practical implications, as for example they may help policymakers in
devising nudge strategies that rely on ad hoc option orders.1. Background
Our decisions are rarely based on options that are presented simultaneously.
For example, in supermarkets items are often placed at discrete locations
and encountered one after the other. Therefore, an important research question
is whether varying the order of option presentation influences the value of
options, hence affecting decision-making. Scientists have investigated this ques-
tion revealing a systematic preference for specific positions within a sequence of
options [1–6]. Specifically, primacy effects, reflecting a preference for options
offered early in a sequence, have emerged in some conditions while recency
effects, corresponding to a preference for options offered later, have been
observed in other conditions.
A recent model of choice [7,8] has raised the possibility that, independent of
processes responsible for primacy and recency effects, another form of order
effect could be critical when decision-making is characterized by sequential
options. This influence would be exerted by expectations about the value of
options. The model from which this proposal is derived [7,8] was developed
to explain context effects on value attribution and choice. A central premise
is that individuals keep track of the distribution of rewards encountered in an
environment or context. When a stimulus is presented in a context, individuals
are assumed to rely on knowledge about the contextual reward distribution
when evaluating the stimulus. The model proposes that the subjective value
of the stimulus is influenced by its associated reward prediction error (RPE).
Specifically, the subjective value is predicted to increase if the stimulus is
better than expected (relative to the contextual reward distribution), and to
diminish if the stimulus is worse than expected.
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2This perspective has implications for scenarios where
options are offered sequentially. Previous accounts have
assumed that all options within a trial are equally affected by
the context, even when presentation is sequential [7,8]. On the
contrary, the model proposed by Rigoli et al. [7,8] implicates
that options presented sequentially will not all be equally
affected by context. Instead, each option will be influenced dif-
ferently based on its associated RPE, namely based on the
difference between the offered and expected reward for that
option. Specifically, in an option sequence a greater (weaker)
subjective value will be attributed to an option when it elicits a
positive (negative) RPE. The prediction that, when options are
offered sequentially, those that elicit a better RPE will be more
attractive remains to be explored empirically, and here we pro-
vide such test. We designed a novel decision-making task
where we varied both the order of option presentation and the
expectations about option value. This allowed us to test the
possibility that, when options are presented sequentially, those
eliciting a positive (negative) RPE are favoured (disfavoured).Figure 1. Task paradigm. On each trial, participants are presented with two
options, one returning amount x/2 for sure (e.g. 6 H, where x ¼ £6) and
the other (e.g. 6 G) offering a 50/50 gamble between amount x and zero.
Two different contexts alternate across blocks, namely a low-value context in
which the amount x can be either £2 or £6 (resulting in the following choices:
£1 versus £2/£0 and £3 versus £6/£0, respectively), and a high-value context in
which the amount x can be either £6 or £10 (resulting in the following choices:
£3 versus £6/£0 and £5 versus £10/£0, respectively). During an intertrial interval
(ITI) of 1.5 s, participants are informed about the ongoing context by the cor-
responding amount in brackets (£10, as in this example, for the high-value
context, and £2 for the low value context). Next, one option appears first
(e.g. 6 G corresponding to the gamble), followed, after 1.5 s, by the second
(e.g. 6 H corresponding to the sure option). The option order varies in such a
way that the sure option appears first in half of the trials and the gamble in
the other half. When the second option appears, choice can be realized (after
a variable interval, depending on the response reaction time (RT)) and the
outcome (e.g. £3) is revealed for 1 s.
4722. Methods
(a) Participants
Forty-one healthy right-handed adults (23 females, 18 males;
18–40 years of age, mean age 24) participated in the study (data
are available as the electronic supplementary material). Such
sample size was selected prior to data collection to allow within-
subjects statistical analyses aimed at testing a medium effect size
(Cohen’s d ¼ 0.5) assuming a (two-tailed) significance threshold
of 0.05 and a statistical power of 0.85. This requires 36 participants
minimum. We decided to include five participants more than the
minimum, resulting in 41 participants in total. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None had a history of
head injury, a diagnosis of any neurological or psychiatric con-
dition, or was currently on medication affecting the central
nervous system. The study was approved by the University Col-
lege of London Research Ethics Committee. All participants
provided written informed consent and were paid for participat-
ing. Participants were tested at the Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging at the University College London.(b) Experimental paradigm and procedure
Participants performed a computer-based task lasting approxi-
mately 25 min (figure 1). On each trial (200 trials were run in
total), participants were offered two options, one associated with
a sure gain of £ x/2 and the other with a 50/50 gamble between
£ x or zero. Considering trials where x ¼ £10 as an example, the
sure option was displayed as ‘10 H’ (H indicates half of £10) and
the gamble as ‘10 G’ (G indicates the gamble). Options were pre-
sented on the left and right sides of the screen, respectively
(positions varied randomly). Two aspects were manipulated.
First, options were presented sequentially, with the sure option
appearing first for half of the trials and the gamble appearing
first for the other half. Second, two different contexts alternated
across blocks (each block comprised 20 trials; blocks alternated
pseudo-randomly). In a low-value context, the amount x could be
either £2 or £6 (resulting in the following choices: £1 versus £2/
£0 and £3 versus £6/£0, respectively), while in a high-value context
the amount x could be either £6 or £10 (resulting in the following
choices: £3 versus £6/£0 and £5 versus £10/£0, respectively).
The ongoing context was explicitly signalled to participants
throughout each block by a monetary amount shown in brackets
on the top of the screen (£2 for the low-value context and £10 for
the high-value context). Before a transition to a different context,a panel on the screen informed participants on the upcoming con-
text. The first option appeared when a new trial started and was
followed by the second option after 1.5 s. At this time point, one
option could be selected by pressing either the left or the right
arrow-key on the keyboard. Next, the outcome was revealed
(appearing for 1 s), and was followed by an intertrial interval of
1.5 s. Participants had 3 s to finalize a choice. If a response occurred
later, a ‘too late’ text appeared corresponding to a zero outcome.
Before the experiment, participants were instructed about the
task, the gamble probability, and on how payment was derived.
Then, they were familiarized with the task by performing 200
trials (this to reinforce their knowledge about context and the
ensuing expectations about option value before the task started).
At the end of the experiment, one single trial was randomly
selected and the associated outcome was paid out in addition
to a fixed £5 endowment.
(c) Predictions
Predictions derived from Rigoli et al. [7,8] in this task can be
examined by focusing on the low-value context first. During
trials in which x ¼ £6, the option presented first informs partici-
pants that this is a relatively good trial (given that the alternative
condition in the low-value context has x ¼ £2), and therefore
presentation of this first option elicits a positive RPE. Note
that, by design, in our task presentation of the second option
never provides any extra information, and consequently it is
low-value context high-value context
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Figure 2. Model’s prediction. (a) Predicted proportion of the choice of the first option for the different conditions (L ¼ low-value context; H ¼ high-value context),
derived from the reference-dependent model of Rigoli et al. [7,8]. (b) Predicted proportion of the choice of the first option for the different conditions, derived from
an alternative reference-dependent model where the context influences equally all options within a sequence.
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3always associated with a null RPE. By contrast, considering the
high-value context, during trials in which x ¼ £6 the option pre-
sented first informs participants that this is a relatively bad trial
(given that the alternative condition in the high-value context has
x ¼ £10), and therefore presentation of the first option elicits a
negative RPE. Hence, the model of Rigoli et al. [7,8] predicts
that, when x ¼ £6, the option presented first should be preferred
more in the low- compared to the high-value context. Following
an analogous line of reasoning, the option presented first is
assumed to elicit a negative RPE when x ¼ £2 and a positive
RPE when x ¼ £10, hence predicting that it should be selected
more often in the latter compared to the former condition.
The same reasoning can be expressed formally. The model of
Rigoli et al. [7,8] proposes that, in a sequence of options, the sub-
jective value V(y) of an option associated with position y and
reward R(y) corresponds to a weighted RPE (adapted from [7,8]):
V(y) ¼ (R(y) E(y))
s2
, ð2:1Þ
where E(y) is the expected reward (which depends on expec-
tations elicited by the context) for the option associated with
position y, and s2 is an uncertainty parameter (here assumed
to be constant for all options). Crucially, the model proposes
that the expected reward E(y) is a function of the position of
an option within a sequence, implying that it can vary across
options within the same trial. We can use the model to simulate
choice behaviour in our task (figure 2a). This simulation is based
on two assumptions which reflect the task structure. First, to cap-
ture the manipulation of context, we assumed that the expected
reward associated with the option presented first during the
low-value context EL(1) is lower than the expected reward associ-
ated with the option presented first during the high-value
context EH(1) (i.e. EL(1) , EH(1)). This implies that, according
to equation (2.1), the subjective value of the option presented
first will increase and decrease in the low-value and high-value
context, respectively. Second, to capture the fact that contextual
expectations do not affect the option presented second, we
assumed that, for all conditions, the expected reward for theoption presented second Ei(2) is equal to the reward associated
with the option presented first Ri(1) (i.e. Ei(2) ¼ Ri(1)). This
implies that, according to equation (2.1), the subjective value of
the option presented second does not vary across conditions.
Figure 2a shows that, according to this model, the predicted pro-
portion of choices of the option presented first will be higher for
£10 in the high-value context and for £6 in the low-value context.
We can compare these predictions against an alternative refer-
ence model (figure 2b) where expectations elicited by the
context affect both available options equally, independent of
their position (in other words where EL(y) . EH(y) and Ei(1) ¼
Ei(2)). This alternative reference model does not predict any
order effect, as the proportion of choice of the option presented
first is equal for all conditions (figure 2b).
Themodel of Rigoli et al. [7,8] raises the specific prediction that a
preference for the option presented first will vary across conditions
as shown in figure 2a. The model is agnostic about whether a pri-
macy effect (i.e. an overall preference for the first option) or
recency effect (an overall preference for the second option) will
also emerge. These effects have been reported previously [1–6]
and could also be assessed in our task. However, we emphasize
that our task was optimized to investigate predictions derived
from Rigoli et al. [7,8] and not for examining recency and primacy
effects (see Discussion for a comparison between our task and
prior literature on recency and primacy effects).3. Results
Wefirst characterized ageneral gamblingdisposition inour task
(table 1; figure 2). The total proportion of gamble choices did not
differ significantly from 0.5 (table 1; figure 2; mean¼ 0.43;
median¼ 0.53; s.d.¼ 0.26; t40¼ 21.66, p ¼ 0.105; d ¼ 20.26;
two-tailed alpha, 0.05 was used as significance criterion in
all analyses). In other words, although individual differences
were evident with respect to the attractiveness of the gamble
(table 1; figure 2), participants on average were neither
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Figure 3. Empirical data. (a) The proportion of gambling choices (+s.e.) is shown considering RPE and CFO (gambling first: the gamble is presented as first option;
gambling second: the gamble is presented as second option) as factors. A significant RPE-CFO interaction emerged from these data (F1,40 ¼ 15.43, p , 0.001;
h2P ¼ 0:278). (b) The proportion of choices of the option presented first (+s.e.) is shown considering RPE and context (L ¼ low-value context; H ¼ high-value
context) as factors. A main effect of RPE emerges from these data (F1,40 ¼ 10.00, p ¼ 0.003; h2P ¼ 0:200), but no RPE-context interaction (F1,40 ¼ 0.17, p ¼
0.684; h2P ¼ 0:004).
Table 1. For different conditions, the table reports descriptive statistics regarding to the proportion of choice of the gamble (gambling ﬁrst: the gamble is
presented as ﬁrst option; gambling second: the gamble is presented as second option; L ¼ low-value context; H ¼ high-value context).
condition mean 95% CI s.d. median min max
total 0.43 [0.35–0.52] 0.26 0.53 0 0.85
positive RPE; gamble ﬁrst 0.45 [0.37–0.54] 0.27 0.48 0 1
negative RPE; gamble ﬁrst 0.41 [0.32–0.52] 0.31 0.46 0 1
positive RPE; gamble second 0.41 [0.32–0.49] 0.27 0.50 0 1
negative RPE; gamble second 0.45 [0.36–0.55] 0.30 0.52 0 1
£2 L; gamble ﬁrst 0.43 [0.33–0.54] 0.33 0.48 0 1
£6 L; gamble ﬁrst 0.45 [0.35–0.56] 0.33 0.48 0 1
£6 H; gamble ﬁrst 0.41 [0.30–0.51] 0.33 0.40 0 1
£10 H; gamble ﬁrst 0.45 [0.36–0.55] 0.29 0.48 0 1
£2 L; gamble second 0.46 [0.35–0.57] 0.34 0.48 0 1
£6 L; gamble second 0.41 [0.31–0.51] 0.32 0.40 0 1
£6 H; gamble second 0.45 [0.35–0.55] 0.32 0.52 0 1
£10 H; gamble second 0.40 [0.31–0.49] 0.29 0.44 0 1
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4risk-seeking nor risk-averse. The observation of an absence of
risk aversion during decisions involving gains is inconsistent
with prevailing theories (e.g. [9,10]), though it replicates pre-
vious research using analogous tasks [7,11,12]. This pattern
can be explained by the possibility that an increased risk pro-
pensity occurs when small monetary amounts are at stake [13].
Next, we asked whether gambling varied across the
different conditions. To test this, we ran a 2  2  2 ANOVA
of gambling proportion with context (high-value versus low-value), RPE (positive versus negative) and category of the
first option (CFO; reflecting whether the option presented
first was the gamble or the sure option) as factors (table 1;
figure 3a). Specifically, with respect to the context and RPE fac-
tors, trials where x ¼ £2 were associated with low-value
context and negative RPE; trials where x ¼ £10were associated
with high-value context and positive RPE; trials where x ¼ £6
were associated either with low-value context and positive
RPE or with high-value context and negative RPE. Results
Table 2. For different conditions, the table reports descriptive statistics relative to the proportion of choice of the option presented ﬁrst (gambling ﬁrst: the
gamble is presented as ﬁrst option; gambling second: the gamble is presented as second option; L ¼ low-value context; H ¼ high-value context).
condition mean 95% CI s.d. median min max
total 0.50 [0.49–0.52] 0.054 0.50 0.38 0.72
positive RPE 0.48 [0.46–0.50] 0.065 0.49 0.31 0.72
negative RPE 0.52 [0.50–0.54] 0.061 0.51 0.44 0.72
£2 L; gamble ﬁrst 0.43 [0.33–0.54] 0.33 0.48 0 1
£6 L; gamble ﬁrst 0.45 [0.35–0.56] 0.33 0.48 0 1
£6 H; gamble ﬁrst 0.41 [0.30–0.51] 0.33 0.40 0 1
£10 H; gamble ﬁrst 0.45 [0.36–0.55] 0.29 0.48 0 1
£2 L; gamble second 0.54 [0.43–0.65] 0.34 0.52 0 1
£6 L; gamble second 0.59 [0.48–0.69] 0.32 0.60 0 1
£6 H; gamble second 0.55 [0.45–0.65] 0.32 0.48 0 1
£10 H; gamble second 0.60 [0.51–0.69] 0.29 0.56 0 1
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5showed no main effect of context (F1,40 ¼ 0.17, p ¼ 0.677;
h2P ¼ 0:004), no main effect of RPE (F1,40 ¼ 0.05, p ¼ 0.831;
h2P ¼ 0:001), no main effect of CFO (F1,40¼ 0.14, p ¼ 0.715;
h2P ¼ 0:003), no context-RPE interaction (F1,40¼ 0.04, p ¼
0.847; h2P ¼ 0:001), no context-CFO interaction (F1,40¼ 0.03,
p ¼ 0.875; h2P ¼ 0:001), and no three-way interaction (F1,40¼
0.40, p ¼ 0.529; h2P ¼ 0:010). However, we found a significant
RPE-CFO interaction (F1,40¼ 15.43, p, 0.001; h2P ¼ 0:278).
This effect indicates that, comparing trials where the first
option elicits a positive RPE against trials where it elicits a
negative RPE, gambling increases when the first option is a
gamble (figure 3a). This finding is consistent with our pre-
diction derived from Rigoli et al. [7,8], because it shows that,
when presentation of the gamble elicits a positive RPE,
gambling increases.
Previous research on decision-making conditions where
options are presented sequentially has asked whether any pos-
ition in a sequence systematically boosts preference [1–6].
Primacy effects (i.e. a preference for options presented first)
have been observed, though in some conditions recency effects
(i.e. a preference for options presented last) also arise [5].
Although our task was not optimized for investigating these
effects, we asked whether primacy or recency effects also
emerged from our data. We found that the total proportion
of choices for the option presented first did not differ signifi-
cantly from 0.5 (table 2; figure 3b; mean ¼ 0.50; median ¼
0.50; s.d.¼ 0.05; t40 ¼ 0.38, p ¼ 0.708; d ¼ 0.06). In other
words, participants did not exhibit any systematic preference
for the first nor for the second option in the sequence.
Next, we examined the specific prediction of the model of
Rigoli et al. [7,8] with respect to the probability of choosing
the option presented first for the different conditions, which
is described in figure 2a. To test this, we ran a 2  2  2
ANOVA as above (having context, RPE and CFO as factors)
but where the dependent variable was now the proportion
of choices for the first option (table 2; figure 3b). This analysis
showed no main effect of context (F1,40 ¼ 0.17, p ¼ 0.684;
h2P ¼ 0:004), no main effect of CFO (F1,40 ¼ 2.75, p ¼ 0.105;
h2P ¼ 0:065), no context-RPE interaction (F1,40 ¼ 0.17, p ¼
0.684; h2P ¼ 0:004), no context-CFO interaction (F1,40 ¼ 0.17,
p ¼ 0.678; h2P ¼ 0:004), no CFO-RPE interaction (F1,40 ¼ 0.05,
p ¼ 0.832; h2P ¼ 0:001), and no three-way interaction (F1,40 ¼0.04, p ¼ 0.847; h2P ¼ 0:001). However, we observed a main
effect of RPE (F1,40 ¼ 10.00, p ¼ 0.003; h2P ¼ 0:200). Consistent
with our prediction [7,8], this effect is driven by a larger pro-
portion of choices for the option presented first when the RPE
is positive compared to negative. The results of this analysis
fit with model’s predictions described in figure 2a.
In our task, trials where x ¼ £6 were exactly equivalent
across contexts, except that in the low-value context presen-
tation of the first option elicited a positive RPE, while in the
high-value context it elicited a negative RPE. Therefore, the
most stringent test of our hypotheses is a comparison between
low- and high-value context for trials where x ¼ £6. Consistent
with our prediction [7,8], when comparing low- and high-
value context for trials where x ¼ £6, our analyses revealed a
higher proportion of choices for the option presented first
(table 2; figure 3b; t40 ¼ 3.54, p ¼ 0.001; dz ¼ 0.55).
In short, we found that our task was characterized by an
absence of systematic risk seeking or risk aversion, that
gambling preference was unaffected by the different task
conditions, and we observed no primacy or recency effects
induced by a sequential presentation of options. Nevertheless,
consistent with hypotheses derived from a previous model
[7,8], our analyses revealed an increased likelihood of selecting
the option presented first when that option signalled a better-
than-expected value, compared to when it signalled a value
that was worse than expected.4. Discussion
We studied the impact of presenting options sequentially on
decision-making. By manipulating a contextual reward distri-
bution, we induced different expectations so that the option
presented first in a sequence elicited either a positive or
negative RPE. We found that the first option was favoured
when it elicited a positive, compared to a negative, RPE.
To our knowledge, this represents the first evidence of
documenting an effect of option order exerted by expectations
about option value.
Our observations fit with theories viewing subjective value
as inherently context-dependent [7,8,11,12,14–28]. According
to this perspective, the subjective value of a stimulus derives
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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6from a comparison of the stimulus against other potential
stimuli in a context. Our study contributes to this literature
by supporting the notion that, when options are offered
sequentially, context does not affect all options equally, but it
can induce specific expectations for different positions and
hence affect each option differently. This process is consistent
with the form of order effect observed here, whereby the con-
text determines whether a given position (in our study, the
first position of the sequence) will be favoured or not.
While previous research has documented primacy and
recency effects emerging when options are presented sequen-
tially during decision-making [1–6], these effects were absent
in our task. This raises the question of which conditions
allow primacy and recency effects to emerge. To answer this,
it is helpful to consider the key differences between prior litera-
ture and our task design. In the former, participants were
presented with novel options (i.e. options never experienced
before) and the attributes of an option had to be learnt at the
time when the option was on offer. For example, in a study
asking participants to taste and evaluate a new wine, the
wine’s features were learnt while the wine was offered as an
option [5]. This focus on learning is absent in our study,
where participants were already familiar with the options
(given the long training session). Another difference is that pre-
vious literature adopted longer temporal delays between
subsequent options (e.g. [5]) and presented each option for a
longer time (e.g. [4,5]). Some studies also included a filler
task between option presentation and choice [4]. These fea-
tures, charactering previous research but absent in our task,
are likely to engage memory processes that could be critical
for primacy and recency effects. Finally, in previous literature
options were characterized by many and relatively complex
attributes (e.g. in the study involving decision-making about
wine; [5]). On the contrary, our study relied upon simple choices
involving monetary amounts and probabilities. Altogether, the
focus on learning, memory and on complex options, character-
izing previous literature but not our study, could explain why
recency and primacy effects were absent in our data.A critical variable in tasks where options are offered
sequentially is the temporal interval characterizing option
presentation. It remains unknown whether the delay between
options modulates order effects, a question which remains
open with respect to classical primacy and recency effects
as well as with respect to the order effects highlighted here.
A related question is whether order effects vary when com-
paring conditions engaging memory (i.e. when an option
disappears after it is presented, although it remains available;
as in previous research on recency and primacy effects)
against conditions where memory is not engaged (when an
option does not disappear after it is presented; as in this
study).
Our observations are relevant to a number of practical
domains. The notion of a nudge is used to characterize
decision frames designed by policymakers to safeguard
choice freedom and simultaneously promote common goals
[29]. Our findings may help in devising effective nudges,
by suggesting a benefit from locating a target option in tem-
poral and spatial positions where it is appraised as better
than expected.
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